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Mereological nihilism: Keeping it Simple
1. Introduction
In this paper I argue that, contra Karen Bennett, (mereological) nihilism is more ontologically
parsimonious than its main rival, (mereological) universalism.
Nihilism1 is the view that there are no composite material objects – there are only simples, i.e.
objects with no proper parts, which are most naturally identified with sub-atomic particles such as
quarks (for brevity’s sake I’ll assume that all such sub-atomic particles are quarks).2 In contrast,
universalists3 posit the mereological fusion of every collection of disjoint objects. The universalist
ontology is therefore populated not only by quarks, but also by composite objects such as tables,
donkeys, table-donkeys, etc.
So, both the nihilist and universalist ontologies contain all of the quarks, but the universalist
ontology is further bloated by composite objects. There is thus a prima facie case for nihilism being
more quantitatively parsimonious than universalism because it seems to posit fewer entities (tout
court), and more qualitatively parsimonious because it seems to posit fewer distinct kinds of entity
(it doesn’t posit composite objects). If this prima facie case can be vindicated, it’s a significant result
for the nihilist: ontological parsimony is almost always thought to be a theoretical virtue, so a nihilist
1 Rosen & Dorr (2002) and Sider (2013) have defended nihilism.
2 I’m also going to assume that all material objects are either simples or ultimately composed of simples. I take
this to be a warranted assumption because if it’s false then at least some objects are gunky, in which case
nihilism is false (see Sider 1993) and there’d be no point in debating its relative parsimony.
3 Lewis (1986: 212-3) and Sider (2001: esp. 121-32) have defended universalism.
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victory in the quantitative and qualitative parsimony stakes gives us a defeasible reason to be
nihilists.
In this paper I vindicate the prima facie case for nihilism’s victory in the parsimony stakes by
responding to two arguments that seek to undermine the case. I’ll first (§2) consider an argument
from Karen Bennett to the effect that, on closer inspection, nihilism is no more quantitatively
parsimonious than universalism. I’ll argue that, contra Bennett, on even closer inspection, nihilism
posits fewer entities than universalism. I’ll then (§3) suggest that Bennett’s reasoning can be
redirected to attack the claim that nihilism is more qualitatively parsimonious than universalism.
Again, I’ll reject this and argue that nihilism posits fewer kinds of entity than universalism. I’ll
conclude (§4) that nihilism is both more quantitatively and qualitatively parsimonious than
universalism.
2.1. Bennett’s argument
Here’s a brief reconstruction of Bennett’s argument:
(1) Theory A is more quantitatively parsimonious than theory B iff A posits fewer entities than B.
(2) Properties are entities.
(2) is controversial, but Bennett claims that if it’s false then a more complicated nominalist-friendly
version of her argument invoking ideological parsimony can be made instead (2009: 64). I’ll grant
that she’s right about this and won’t dispute (2).
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(3) For every composite object posited by universalism, there is a perplural property (I’ll say
more about these below) posited by nihilism.
This is the crucial premise. I’ll elaborate on it and present Bennett’s defence of it below. For now,
moving on:
(4) So, nihilism and universalism posit the same number of entities.
(5) So, nihilism and universalism are equally quantitatively parsimonious.4
The argument as stated isn’t valid. So Bennett must be assuming the following premise between (3)
and (4), which validates the argument:
(3.5) If we ignore the universalist’s composite objects and the nihilist’s alleged perplural
properties, universalism and nihilism posit the same number of entities.
An inventory of the nihilist and universalist ontologies demonstrates the plausibility of (3.5). First,
both ontologies contain the quarks. Second, both ontologies contain the singular properties of the
quarks, such as having +½ spin. Third, both ontologies contain the plural arrangement-properties of
the quarks. Plural properties are properties that are instantiated by multiple xs, without entailing the
existence of any singular composite entity which we might call ‘the multiple xs’,5 and which are non-
4 Bennett hedges by claiming that the two theories merely ‘come out roughly on a par’ (2009: 64, my
emphasis) in terms of the amount of entities they posit and that ‘it is not obvious’ that nihilism is more
parsimonious than universalism (63). But her reasoning appears to support the unhedged conclusion, so,
having made this caveat, I’ll continue to characterise her as endorsing (5).
5 Bennett accepts this point (2009: 59), though see Linnebo (2003).
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distributive in that they are only instantiated by the xs collectively, not by each individual x.6 Plural
arrangement-properties determine how some objects are arranged.7 Fourth, the nihilist ontology
contains plural properties that don’t concern the arrangement of the quarks, such as [collectively]
weighing 20kg; the universalist ontology contains singular properties of composites such as
weighing 20kg. There appears to be a one-to-one correspondence between these nihilist plural non-
arrangement-properties and universalist singular properties of composites.
This inventory seems exhaustive. So I’ll grant (3.5).
Bennett’s argument now turns on (3). In the remainder of this section I present her defence of it.
Bennett argues (2009: 60, 64) that the nihilist cannot give an adequate account of the often
complexly structured nature of reality with an ontology consisting only of quarks, singular properties,
and plural properties. ‘Complexly structured’ here applies to any structure that has substructures. So
consider a (putative) molecule, for example. Best science has it that molecules are made out of
atoms, which (roughly speaking) are made out of quarks. Putative molecules thus have a complex
structure: an overall molecular structure with atomic substructures. So putative molecules are a
6 For example, if the plural property of surrounding the building is instantiated by some police officers, then it’s
neither the case that each police officer would instantiate this property on her own, nor that this commits us
to some singular composite entity called ‘the police officers’.
7 One might object that the universalist doesn’t need to posit plural arrangement-properties. But I’ll assume
that she does, for three reasons: 1) Bennett agrees (2009: 64); 2) It’s just implausible to suggest that the
quarks aren’t arranged: they stand in spatial relations to one another, which appears to be all that’s required
to be arranged; 3) To anticipate an argument I make in §3, the universalist needs to say that the quarks are
arranged e.g. F-wise in order to explain why they compose an F (rather than a G).
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good example of the bits of reality that Bennett thinks the nihilist is going to have difficulty in
adequately accounting for.
Now, the nihilist usually takes herself to be able to adequately account for putative molecules (and
all other putative composite objects for that matter) by adopting a strategy familiar from van
Inwagen (1990: 98-114) and Rosen & Dorr (2002). Where there appears to be a composite molecule,
the nihilist claims that there are instead just some quarks arranged molecule-wise. In other words,
the nihilist takes herself to be able to use the quarks and the plural arrangement-properties (in
particular, the property of being arranged molecule-wise) that are already in her ontology to
adequately account for putative molecules. After all, the empirical data apparently underdetermines
whether there are composite molecules or just simples that instantiate being arranged molecule-
wise, so the nihilist account appears to be consistent with best science and therefore adequate.
But Bennett argues that, to give an adequate account of reality, the nihilist must tell a more
complicated story about the way the quarks are arranged than simply saying that they are arranged
molecule-wise (2009: 59-60). Simply saying that the quarks are arranged molecule-wise doesn’t give
an adequate account of putative molecules because it doesn’t capture their complex structure and
therefore isn’t consistent with best science. Accounting for putative molecules by claiming that there
are quarks that instantiate being arranged molecule-wise only captures the overall molecular
structure of the putative molecule. It says nothing about, and therefore fails to capture, the atomic
substructures, and is analogous to some ill-informed scientist claiming that the quarks only compose
molecules, without first composing atoms.8
8 A natural response here for the nihilist is that the atomic substructures are somehow included in what it is for
the quarks to be arranged molecule-wise. But this is just to say that the predicate ‘arranged molecule-wise’
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Given this, the nihilist might be tempted to say instead that the quarks instantiate being arranged
atom-wise, and it’s the atom-wise arrangements of quarks that instantiate being arranged molecule-
wise. This would allow her to capture both the overall molecular structure and the atomic
substructures of the putative molecule. But of course, accepting that the atom-wise arrangements of
quarks instantiate a property commits the nihilist to positing atom-wise arrangements (i.e.,
presumably, atoms), which she cannot accept.
So the nihilist must find some other way of capturing, or accounting for, complex structures such as
that of the putative molecule. In Bennett’s words, the nihilist must ‘preserve compositional
structure’ when she gives her composite-free account of reality (60). Her ontology of quarks and
plural arrangement-properties alone doesn’t give her the tools she needs to do this (and the other
plural properties and singular properties in her ontology aren’t going to help).
Bennett concludes that the nihilist must inflate her ontology with new, complex arrangement-
properties that the nihilist can say are instantiated by the quarks, thereby allowing the nihilist to
capture complex structures in reality (2009: 60). I’ll call these ‘perplural arrangement-properties’,
because the bit of language that describes them is called ‘perplural predication’ (see Uzquiano
2004). Perplural properties are to plural properties what plural properties are to ordinary singular
properties. Whilst plural properties tell us what properties groups of xs have, without entailing the
existence of a composite ‘group of xs’, perplural properties tell us what properties groups of groups
of (groups of groups of… etc.) xs have, without entailing the existence of a singular composite ‘group
picks out a complicated property that captures both the atomic substructures and overall molecular structure,
which is exactly the sort of property that, as we’ll see, Bennett is trying to get the nihilist to posit here.
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of groups of xs’. Perplural arrangement-properties allow us to capture complex structures whilst
only committing us to the existence of the basic building blocks of the structures. For example, to
capture the complex structure of a putative molecule, the nihilist can say that the quarks instantiate
the perplural property of being arranged ((atom-wise) molecule-wise). This complex property
captures how the quarks are arranged into atomic structures, which are themselves arranged into a
molecular structure, but which doesn’t entail the existence of atomic structures (atoms).
So the nihilist apparently must posit perplural arrangement-properties to account for complex
structures in reality. And, claims Bennett, the nihilist must posit one of these perplural properties for
every composite object the universalist posits (2009: 65) (for example, where the universalist posits
a composite molecule, the nihilist must posit being arranged ((atom-wise) molecule-wise)). If this is
right, then it follows that (3) holds.
Given that I’ve granted the other premises of Bennett’s argument, if her defence of (3) succeeds
then her conclusion that nihilism and universalism are equally quantitatively parsimonious follows.
In the next subsection, however, I’ll say why (3) is false and should be replaced with a different
premise that generates a different conclusion: that nihilism is more quantitatively parsimonious than
universalism.
2.2. A recount
Premise (3) of Bennett’s argument (as I’ve reconstructed it) is false. Though I concede that the
nihilist must posit perplural arrangement-properties for the reasons Bennett gives, contra Bennett




My argument here will make use of the notion of first-level and higher-level composites, which I
define in terms of being directly and indirectly composed by the simples respectively. So let us say
that:
X is directly composed by the ys iff x is composed by the ys and there are no zs such that the zs are
composed by the ys and x is composed by the zs;
X is indirectly composed by the ys iff x is composed by the ys but there are some zs such that x is
composed by the zs and the zs are composed by the ys;
X is a first-level composite iff x is directly composed by the simples;
X is a higher-level composite iff x is indirectly composed by the simples.
For example, according to the universalist, molecules are higher-level composites because they’re
indirectly composed by quarks (i.e. the simples): a molecule is composed by the quarks, but it is also
composed by the atoms which themselves are composed by the quarks. In contrast, the
universalist’s first-level composites are the quark-pairs, where ‘quark-pair’ refers to the mereological
fusion of two quarks: for any quark-pair, there can be no other objects that are composed by two
quarks that themselves compose the quark pair.
We can now deploy these terms to undermine Bennett’s argument. To establish (3), Bennett needs
the nihilist to have to posit as many perplural properties as the universalist posits composite objects,
both higher-level and first-level. But the nihilist need only posit as many perplural properties as the
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universalist posits higher-level composite objects. This is because Bennett’s argument only compels
the nihilist to posit perplural properties to account for complexly structured putative composites,
and the only complexly structured putative composites are the higher-level ones. Putative first-level
composites have no internal substructure as they are composed directly by the simples: quark-pairs
only have an overall ‘quark-pair’ structure, and since the quarks that (directly) compose them are
simple, they have no internal substructure that needs to be captured by the nihilist with a perplural
property. As such, the nihilist doesn’t need to posit perplural properties to account for putative first-
level composites. She can instead simply use quarks and merely plural arrangement-properties to
account for them. Where the universalist posits a composite quark-pair, the nihilist need only posit
the plural property of being arranged quark-pair-wise.
So (3) is false and should be replaced with
(3*) The nihilist posits fewer perplural properties than the universalist posits composite objects.
(1), (2), (3*), (3.5) and (4) together entail my conclusion:
(5*) Nihilism is more quantitatively parsimonious than universalism.
3. Bennett’s argument redirected
Bennett’s argument can be redirected so as to attack the claim that nihilism is more qualitatively
parsimonious than universalism. Whilst universalism countenances a kind of entity that the nihilist
doesn’t, i.e. composite objects, Bennett’s reasoning apparently demonstrates that the nihilist must
in turn posit a kind of entity that the universalist doesn’t, i.e. perplural properties. If this is right then
the nihilist cannot claim victory in the qualitative parsimony stakes.
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In response, I claim that the universalist must posit perplural properties too, thus tipping the balance
of qualitative parsimony back into the nihilist’s favour. I have two arguments for this.
3.1 Two Arguments
First argument. Facts about the ways some quarks are arranged seem to depend solely on facts
about the locations of the quarks, not on facts about whether the quarks compose anything or not
(Brenner 2015: 1311). Since the nihilist and the universalist agree on the locations of the quarks,
they ought to agree on the way the quarks are arranged (even though they disagree on whether the
quarks also compose something). For the sorts of reasons I elaborated on in §2.1, the nihilist must in
some cases say that the quarks are arranged ((atom-wise) molecule-wise).9 So the universalist must
say so too. Thus the universalist must posit perplural properties such as being arranged ((atom-wise)
molecule-wise).
Second argument. The universalist must posit perplural properties to account for what it is in virtue
of which (higher-level) composite objects exist. Let me explain.
9 Actually, given that the universalist’s first-level composites are quark-pairs, not atoms, she must actually say
something closer to ‘the quarks are arranged (((quark-pair-wise) atom-wise) molecule-wise)’. Nothing turns on
this wrinkle, which I’ll ignore in what follows.
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Most believers in composites, including universalists, accept that composites are not fundamental,
but rather exist in virtue of their parts.10 For example, the molecule is usually thought to exist in
virtue of the atoms that compose it. One of the features of the in-virtue-of relation is that if x exists
in virtue of y then facts about y fix (or determine) all of the facts about x (e.g. Schaffer 2009: 351). So
facts about the atoms are supposed to fix all of the facts about the molecule. Furthermore, since
atoms are supposed to exist in virtue of the quarks that compose them, facts about the quarks are
supposed to fix all of the facts about the atoms.11
So far so unproblematic for the universalist. But there’s a twist. The in-virtue-of relation is transitive
(e.g. Audi 2012: §4): if x exists in virtue of y, and y exists in virtue of z, then x exists in virtue of z. If
the molecule exists in virtue of the atoms, and the atoms exist in virtue of the quarks, then the
10 E.g. Cameron (2014), Korman (2016: §4), Koslicki (2008: 186), and Wilson (2014) accept this more or less
explicitly. Even those who don’t explicitly accept it are most naturally read to be tacitly endorsing it, and the
claim seems required to explain the intimate connection between composites and their parts, as
demonstrated by e.g. the fact that, the parts always go wherever the whole they compose goes (see Cameron
[2014] for elaboration of this point). Some believers in composites might follow Schaffer (2010) in accounting
for this intimate connection by adopting priority monism, the view that composites exist in virtue of the larger
composites of which they are parts, but this view is non-standard and I won’t discuss it here.
11 It’s possible to hold that universalists should go in for a global rather than local in-virtue-of story: rather than
holding, for example, that local facts about particular atoms fix the facts about the particular molecules they
putatively compose, perhaps we should take the view that, globally, quark-level facts fix the atomic-level facts,
and that atomic-level facts fix the molecular-level facts (see Potochnik [2010: 62-3]). But if such a view is
correct my argument still demonstrates that one of the quark-level facts must be that the quarks instantiate
being arranged ((atom-wise) molecule-wise), which gets me my desired conclusion. Thanks to Lina Jansson for
helpful discussion on this point.
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molecule exists in virtue of the quarks. This implies that facts about the quarks must fix all of the
facts about the molecule. Crucially, one of the facts about the molecule that must be fixed by facts
about the quarks is the fact about the molecule’s complex structure. Only a fact about what
arrangement-property the quarks instantiate will do the trick. But what arrangement-property must
the quarks instantiate to fix the complex structure of the molecule? This is essentially the same
question that the nihilist was faced with in §2.1: how to account for the putative molecule and its
complex structure with only quarks and properties of the quarks? The answer is the same. Being
arranged molecule-wise won’t do: as established in §2.1, this doesn’t fix the facts about the atomic
substructures within the molecule. And being arranged atom-wise won’t do either because it fails to
fix the overall molecular structure: each group of quarks that are arranged atom-wise could be
distant to the others, thus not forming an overall molecular structure at all. The only property of the
quarks that fixes the fact of the molecule’s complex structure is being arranged ((atom-wise)
molecule-wise). So the universalist must accept that the quarks instantiate being arranged ((atom-
wise) molecule-wise), and must therefore posit this perplural property.12
Clearly the point generalises: for every higher-level composite that she posits, the universalist must
also posit a perplural arrangement-property in order to be able to account for what it is in virtue of
which that particular composite exists.
12 The universalist might object that a fact about the quarks other than a fact about what (perplural)
arrangement-property they instantiate can fix the fact about the molecule’s complex structure, thus allowing
her to avoid positing perplural arrangement-properties. But if such a fact could be found then the nihilist could
make use of it too, thus also allowing her to avoid having to posit perplural arrangement-properties to capture
the putative molecule’s complex structure.
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We thus have two independent arguments that demonstrate that the universalist must join the
nihilist in positing perplural properties. Since the universalist also posits an extra kind of object, i.e.
composite objects, her theory is less qualitatively parsimonious than the nihilist’s.
3.2 Objection: what kind of kind do you mean?
Finally, let me address a potential objection to the foregoing argument.13
I’ve suggested that composite objects, simples, perplural properties, and non-perplural properties
constitute distinct kinds from one another, and have used this to argue that nihilism is more
qualitatively parsimonious than universalism. But one might wonder whether we could divide the
world up into kinds in a different way, thereby getting different results about which theory is the
more qualitatively parsimonious. For example, perhaps the relevant kinds for the purposes of
qualitative parsimony comparisons are objects and properties; since nihilism and universalism both
posit these, this would make the two theories come out as equally qualitatively parsimonious, even
if I’m right about the universalist having to join the nihilist in positing perplural properties.
I know of no way to conclusively establish that my way of carving the world up into kinds is the right
way. But, given the dialectic, I don’t really need to. No matter how we decide to count kinds, my
argument in §3.1 leaves the nihilist in a strong dialectical position.
13 I’m grateful to an anonymous referee for pressing me to address this objection.
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This is because, if my argument in §3.1 is sound, the universalist must join the nihilist in positing
perplural properties, which means that the universalist posits everything the nihilist does. So the
universalist posits at least as many kinds of entity as the nihilist. But the universalist also posits
composite objects. Now, on many natural and plausible ways of counting kinds, this extra
commitment to composite objects brings with it a commitment to at least one extra kind of entity. If
so, then my argument that nihilism is more qualitatively parsimonious than universalism goes
through straightforwardly. But even if the universalist’s commitment to composite objects doesn’t
commit her to a new kind of entity (because composite objects belong to a kind that she and the
nihilist already posit), her theory is still only equally as qualitatively parsimonious as nihilism. And
though this means that the nihilist has lost (or, really, tied) the qualitative parsimony battle, she has
still won the ontological parsimony war. For I’ve already demonstrated that nihilism is more
quantitatively parsimonious than universalism, and even those who doubt the importance of
quantitative parsimony in theory choice ought, as Divers (1994: 388) convincingly argues, to at least
regard it as a tie-breaker when trying to assess the ontological costs of two equally qualitatively
parsimonious theories.
In a sense, then, little is at stake here: if I’m wrong about how to count kinds, then nihilism still ends
up being at least equally as qualitatively parsimonious as universalism, which is enough to guarantee
nihilism a win in the overall ontological parsimony stakes. But my way of counting kinds is natural,
and consonant with the intuitive thought that a commitment to composite objects brings with it a
commitment to at least one new kind of entity. So I see no reason to depart from my assumption
that composite objects, simples, perplural properties, and non-perplural properties constitute





I conclude that neither Bennett’s argument nor the suggested redirection thereof succeed, and that
nihilism is indeed more quantitatively and qualitatively parsimonious than universalism. This is
significant: if, as is often supposed, ontological parsimony is a theoretical virtue, then we have a
(defeasible) reason to be nihilists.14
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